By 
In Nevada, “piercing the corporate veil” is now the subject of a statute, NRS 78.747. According to section 2 of this statute, to establish an “alter ego”, three things must be proven:
to. The corporation is influenced and governed by the shareholder, director or officer;
B. There is such a unity of interest and ownership that the corporation and the shareholder, director or officer are inseparable from each other; Y
vs. Adhering to the corporate fiction of a separate entity would sanction fraud or promote gross injustice.
This statute is a codification of the evidence set forth in the previous jurisprudence. See, for example, Ecklund v. Nevada Wholesale Lumber Co., 93 Nev. 196, 562 P.2d 479 (1977), where it was also held that it must be proven that the three elements go beyond the corporate veil. In any case, as the Court pointed out in Baer v. Amos J Walker, Inc., 85 Nev. 219, 220, 452 P.2d 916, 916 (1969), “The corporate mantle is not cast aside lightly.”
Moving on to other relevant considerations, in North Arlington Medical Building, Inc. v. Sanchez Construction Co., 86 Nev. 515, 471 P.2d 240 (1970), where this Court listed, in footnote 3 of its opinion, some 22 factors tending to establish the second element of NRS 78.747 (2). On polar Starhowever, this Court stated that “[t]These factors may indicate the existence of an alter ego relationship, but are not conclusive. “Id., At 747 P.2d 887. Thus, as other courts have done, this Court noted that each veil piercing case is sui generis. “There is no litmus test to determine when corporate fiction should be ignored; the result depends on the circumstances of each case. “Id.
In re Blatstein, 192 F.3d 88, 101 (3rd Cir. 1999). In addition, with respect to shareholder loans to a corporation, the Colorado Court of Appeals has held, in Hill v. Dearmin, 609 P.2d 127, 128 (Colo.App. 1980):
“It would frustrate the purposes of corporate law to expose directors, officers, and shareholders to personal liability for the obligations of a corporation when they, in their individual capacities, contribute funds to, or on behalf of, a corporation for the purpose of helping the corporation to fulfill its financial obligations, and not for the purpose of committing fraud or promoting its personal affairs. “
Therefore, intercompany loans and shareholder loans do not, per se, establish either the asset mix or the existence of an alter ego.
As the law has developed in the decisions of this Court, the “injustice” that could result from the recognition of corporate fiction owes more than merely fortuitous. It must be accompanied by some kind of irregularity on the part of the alleged alter ego. On polar StarFor example, when shareholders learned that a creditor had a legitimate claim against the corporation, they withdrew or diverted corporate funds for their personal use. But “undercapitalization” or “diversion” alone will not meet the third element of the alter ego test. As the Court said in North Arlington:
In any event, it is incumbent on the one seeking to pierce the corporate veil, to demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence, that the financial structure of the corporation is just a sham and caused an injustice.
Id., At 471 P.2d 244. See also, Rowland v. Worst, 99 Nev. 308, 662 P.2d 1332 (1983), where the corporation was clearly undercapitalized, with a negative net worth at the time of trial, corporate formalities had been ignored, no dividends were paid to shareholders, and directors and officers do not receive wages. On the other hand, the corporation had a separate bank account and a contractor’s license in its own name. By virtue of these facts, the Court held, in 662 P.2d 1338:
“Although the evidence shows that the corporation was undercapitalized and that there was little separate existence from … the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the appellants were the alter ego of the … corporation.”
The celebration in Rowland this is somewhat surprising, given that many of the North Arlington factors had been established. But the Court did not give any indication in its opinion that there was any evidence of inequity, injustice or fraud. However, the Court noted that the matters giving rise to the litigation were “a legitimate commercial dispute”. ID., at 662 P.2d 1336. In such a case, therefore, there is no abuse of corporate form that warrants a piercing of the corporate veil. To be sure, this Court has been very conservative in its application of the principles of piercing the veil. And after all, using the corporate form to protect shareholders from liability is precisely what the corporate form is supposed to do.
Finally, NRS 78.747 (2) (c) expressly requires a demonstration that a manifest injustice would result from the recognition of the corporation as a separate entity.